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Abstract 
 This paper applies the legal framework of forum shopping to three levels of Sino-Indian 
relations: bilateral border disputes, regional balancing, and multilateral competition. Brantly 
Womack’s asymmetric power theory is often used to explain the behavior of India and China, 
two emerging states of unequal capabilities.  However, shown by the application of forum 
shopping, his theory fails to consider the increasing costs to non-cooperation as relations move 
into the regional and multilateral realms. Multilateral competition is, therefore, the forum with 
the highest likelihood of Sino-Indian cooperation, which can spill over and reduce tensions in 
bilateral and regional relations as well. 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Introduction 
 In a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh at the 2013 BRICS summit, Xi described the two states as “the world’s two 
largest developing nations with a similar historic mission to boost their social and economic 
development.”   While BRICS summits are just one forum in which China and India interact, an 1
analysis of their bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations paint pictures quite different than 
Xi’s idealistic statement.  As competition increasingly divides these two emerging powers, the 
policy decisions made by both New Delhi and Beijing do not always reflect this sense of a 
shared historic mission. 
 Applying the legal framework of “forum shopping,” the paper will analyze three forums 
of Sino-Indian relations—bilateral border disputes, regional balancing in the Indian Ocean and 
Southeast Asia (SEA), and multilateral power competition—to expose how each emerging power 
views the other.   Traditionally, scholars have relied on Brantly Womack’s asymmetric power 2
theory to examine Chinese relations with its neighbors, including India.  Using a model of a 
larger state (A) and a smaller state (B), Womack predicts how neighboring states with 
asymmetric capabilities will interact.   As he explains, B has proportionally more to gain or lose 3
in its relationship with A than A does in its relationship with B.   The consequent asymmetry in 4
vulnerabilities creates different expectations for the relationship:  B primarily wants A to 
acknowledge its autonomy, while A primarily expects deference from B—meaning B 
acknowledges the real difference in power between the two states.   If an action of the opposing 5
state breaches these expectations, both states feel threatened, and a vicious, conflictual cycle 
between B’s search for recognized autonomy and A’s search for deference will emerge.   Overall, 6
Womack’s asymmetry theory concludes that actions taken by A will have a greater impact on B 
than that of B on A, which has characterized the relationship between China (A) and India (B) 
since the takeoff of Chinese economic growth.  7
 However, while the ongoing border disputes between China and India follow asymmetry 
theory’s policy predictions, the cases of regional balancing and global power competition 
uncover a changing Sino-Indian dynamic.  In the case of each country’s economic presence and 
political influence in the Southeast Asian region, India’s security involvement in the Indian 
!  of !4 19
4
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/4
Ocean and “Look East Policy” interfere with Beijing’s goal of regional hegemony, thus 
challenging its own asymmetric relations with China.  Moreover, relative soft power and shared 
interests in multipolarity at the multilateral level are essential to India’s ability to defy its 
traditionally asymmetric relations with China.  Although Womack predicts that any disturbance 
in an asymmetric power relationship will cause conflict between state A and state B, the pressure 
for cooperation at the global level will improve Sino-Indian relations overall, as the costs of non-
cooperation multiply.  Thus, multilateralism is the ideal forum for India to equalize its current 
asymmetric balance with China. 
Forum 1:  Border Disputes in Sino-Indian Bilateral Relations 
 Borders have played a vital role in Sino-Chinese bilateral relations since the 1950 
Chinese annexation of Tibet, immediately following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in China’s 1949 civil war.   Since that 1950 annexation, border disputes between China 8
and India have been a principle source of distrust between the two powers, which has reinforced 
their asymmetric power relationship.  India—the smaller state—has worried for the past half-
century about Chinese security presence along its borders, and China has done very little to 
assuage such fears among Indian leaders and scholars.  Two border disputes exemplify this 
asymmetric nature of bilateral Sino-Indian relations:  the cases of Tibet and the Jammu and 
Kashmir region. 
Tibet and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
 The Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950 eliminated the historic buffer space between 
colonial India and China, which left some Indian leaders uneasy.   China viewed Tibet as a part 9
of its empire stolen by European imperial powers, and this annexation is just one example of 
China’s attempts to win back lost lands through negotiations with neighbors.   Despite their 10
concern over this aggressive CCP border policy, Indian leaders agreed to sign the Panchsheel 
Agreement of 1954, which not only recognized Chinese control of Tibet but also established the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between China and India.   The Five Principles include 11
the following—largely superficial—rules for Sino-Indian bilateral relations:  respect for each 
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other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s 
domestic affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  12
Although Indian leaders pushed to include these principles in the main text of the Panchsheel 
Agreement, China succeeded in downplaying their significance by limiting the principles to the 
preamble.  13
 It is, therefore, not surprising that distrust grew into an armed conflict along the border 
area of Tibet in 1962, which created a “Nehru-induced delusion”—referring to the post-
independence Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—that India was a victim of unprovoked 
Chinese aggression.   To apply Womack’s theory to this victimization, China, the larger power, 14
invaded the autonomy of India, the smaller power.  Not only did Nehru create this sense of 
victimhood among Indian leaders but his views supporting Tibet’s independence also infringed 
on what China viewed as its historical right to the area.   Distrust and suspicion continued to 15
grow, for the actions of both the larger state and the smaller state invaded their respective desires 
for deference and autonomy.  Shen Dingli argues that China and India’s “problematic handling” 
of this border dispute prevented the long-term cultivation of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, thus foregoing the opportunity to build a bilateral partnership at an early stage in 
their relations.   This conflictual beginning to Sino-Indian politics hurt their historic capability 16
to cooperate bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally, as distrust continued to plague their 
asymmetric relationship. 
 Rajiv Sikri argues that Tibet remains “the single most important factor driving Sino-
Indian relations,” a view that originated from Mao Zedong and still influences contemporary 
Chinese thinking.   In fact, the Beijing Review, News from China, and People’s Daily Online—17
all publications controlled by the CCP—still reiterate that Tibet is a part of modern China.  18
Although China’s hold on Tibet has become more economically motivated, the Tibet question 
continues to cloud Sino-Indian relations.  It enforces the asymmetric power relation between the 
two states, for Indian leaders—just as they did when signing the Panchsheel Agreement—have 
been unable or unwilling to counter growing Chinese security and economic presence.  This 
border dispute will remain a major challenge to Sino-Indian bilateral relations as long as both 
powers abide by the predictions from Womack’s asymmetry theory. 
!  of !6 19
6
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/4
The Princely States of Jammu and Kashmir 
 In addition to Tibet, the princely states of Jammu and Kashmir between India and 
Pakistan are a notable source of Sino-Indian border conflict.  The complicated history of these 
two princely states dates back to March 26, 1846, when the Treaty of Amritsar drew out their 
borders following the Anglo-Sikh War.   In 1947, the princely states were divided into three 19
main sub-units:  India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of which Pakistan ceded to China in 1963.   Pakistan gave 20
over 5,000 square miles of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory to China as a part of a border agreement, 
which arguably marked the beginning of today’s close Sino-Pakistan relationship.   However, 21
the cooperation between China and Pakistan since that agreement has only enforced suspicions 
among Indian leaders, and as long as Sino-Pakistan relations remain strong, Sino-Indian bilateral 
relations are unlikely to improve. 
 Even excluding China’s presence in the Jammu and Kashmir region, India sees Kashmir
—a majority Muslim province in secular India—as “a jewel in the crown of Indian 
nationalism.”   At the same time, Pakistan, a Muslim-majority country, views Kashmir as a part 22
of its own nation, following the arguments of the post-independence “two-nation theory” of 
Pakistan and India.   Pakistan’s ceding of the Gilgit-Baltistan region to China further threatened 23
the deeply identity-based rationale for India’s partition of the princely states.  Similar to the 
Chinese image of Tibet as belonging to the “motherland” of China, India views Jammu and 
Kashmir as belonging to its own motherland.   This border dispute, thus, exemplifies Womack’s 24
asymmetry theory in that China, the larger state, does not care about India’s rationale for 
controlling Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, does not accept Indian autonomy.  Furthermore, 
the role of Pakistan in the case of Jammu and Kashmir further complicates the asymmetry, as 
China cooperates with a historical adversary of India. 
 In the past few years, the political significance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region has 
expanded with Chinese economic growth.  In November 2014, the Chinese government 
committed 45.6 billion US dollars to the building of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), which will run directly through Gilgit-Baltistan and give China direct access to 
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.   Because of the region’s rich hydro resources, mineral wealth, and 25
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forest reserves, Priyanka Singh argues that it is “almost impossible” to imagine CPEC without 
Gilgit-Baltistan.   Not only will CPEC increase China’s economic stakes in Pakistan but it will 26
also inevitably increase Chinese security presence along India’s northwest border in the Jammu 
and Kashmir region.   An increased Chinese economic and security presence along this 27
contested border area will further invade Indian autonomy, but China has shown no concern for 
such an intrusion.  CPEC, therefore, very clearly exposes both China’s indifference towards India 
and its expectation for deference from its less-powerful southern neighbor. 
 To conclude, the border disputes along Tibet and the Jammu and Kashmir region still 
greatly define—and impede—Sino-Indian bilateral cooperation.  Border disputes are the origin 
of a significant amount of distrust between the two powers, which will continue as long as China 
intrudes into Indian domestic autonomy.  This analysis of border disputes shows that Womack’s 
asymmetry theory does apply to the Sino-Indian relationship today, and as a result, bilateral 
relations are the least likely forum for a softening of their asymmetric power balance.  Neither 
India nor China will likely overcome their conflicting historical or economic interests in these 
border regions, therefore preventing future cooperation. 
Forum 2:  Regional Cooperation and Competition in Asia 
 As China and India grow economically, both powers will compete for increased security 
presence in the Indian Ocean and greater economic cooperation with Southeast Asia (SEA). 
Sino-Indian regional balancing actually presents an opportunity to transform their asymmetric 
relationship, for India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP) intrudes upon the traditionally asymmetric 
power relations between Southeast Asian nations and China.  China’s growing presence in both 
the Indian Ocean and SEA poses three potential outcomes that require a consequently aggressive 
Indian regional policy:  Beijing as a maritime power, Beijing as a maritime economy, and Beijing 
as a “polygonal power” in both security and economics.   At the same time, India’s increased 28
maritime involvement creates new dynamics for China’s regional policy.  This second forum of 
Sino-Indian relations, thus, presents a transition from the two countries’ very asymmetric 
bilateral relations to more balanced regional competition. 
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Security in the Indian Ocean 
 Indian and Chinese maritime strategy has grown more aggressive in the Indian Ocean, 
reflecting a slight shift in their asymmetry.  China sees ocean politics as a “new frontier,” not 
only to consolidate its regional power but also to ensure its access to global markets.   In 29
addition to CPEC, other policy actions recently taken by China in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) 
include the construction of ports, pipelines, and commercial bases—some of which run directly 
through India’s South Asian neighbors.   At first, New Delhi ignored China’s expansionary 30
strategy across the Indian Ocean because its leaders falsely believed Beijing would fail to 
challenge Indian IOR dominance.   However, while New Delhi failed to respond, China built 31
ports in Sri Lanka, deployed nuclear submarines in Karachi, and strengthened its security ties 
with various countries in SEA.   Once the Indian government realized the extent of China’s 32
threat to their regional dominance, New Delhi adopted more aggressive policy in the IOR. 
 The past decade saw two shifts in India’s maritime policy.  First, India boosted the 
protection of its coastline following the Mumbai attacks of 2008, in which Pakistani terrorists 
sailed to the coast of Mumbai.   Second, and with greater implications for Chinese presence in 33
the IOR, New Delhi updated is naval strategy in 2015 with a shift from “using” its surrounding 
seas to “securing” them.   India hopes to transform itself from a passive beneficiary of its IOR 34
access to an active security provider in the Indian Ocean, in order to balance Chinese security 
presence in the region.  While China continues to construct ports and improve its access to the 
Indian Ocean, current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced his commitment to 
“consolidating India’s maritime ties and collaborating with Indian neighbors on maritime 
security.”   In contrast with border disputes, New Delhi’s more active rhetoric and policy in the 35
Indian Ocean exposes the importance of regional balancing in the evening of their asymmetric 
relationship. 
 New Delhi’s overall regional security architecture does not include single-power 
domination over the Indian Ocean.   While not explicitly stating that it aspires for such 36
domination, Beijing has focused on a regional security environment in which mutual trust 
guarantees stability and bridges policy differences “through dialogue on an equal footing.”  37
Thus, the IOR region is potentially a space of both competition and cooperation between India 
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and China, as both share common interests in regional stability and securing access to global 
markets.   However, India’s response to Chinese aggression renders the Indian Ocean the first 38
potential forum that challenges Womack’s asymmetry theory. 
ASEAN in Sino-Indian Regional Competition 
 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand founded the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) on August 8, 1967, and its role in Sino-Indian relations has grown as 
both powers attempt to expand their regional influence.   Originally envisioned to be a “risk-39
avoiding organization,” these countries created ASEAN to minimize the threat of conflict either 
within the region or with external actors.   Since the boom in Chinese economic growth, Sino-40
ASEAN relations represent an easy application of Womack’s asymmetry theory, even more so 
than that of India and China.  ASEAN includes relatively small states that do not pose a 
challenge to China’s rise globally or regionally.  However, India’s Look East Policy (LEP), 
which was originally proposed in 1991, interferes with the traditional asymmetric balance 
between ASEAN and China.   By interfering in the Sino-ASEAN relationship, New Delhi has 41
proven not only that it is a rising regional power but also that this rise corresponds with an 
alteration in its own asymmetry with China. 
 The Look East Policy has two primary policy focuses:  increased economic integration 
with ASEAN and a strengthened security architecture between India and the region.  Although 
LEP originally sought to enhance India’s global position after the Cold War, the first formal 
arrangements between India and ASEAN began in the early 2000s with the signing of various 
free trade agreements.   In 2009, total trade between India and ASEAN was 39.1 billion US 42
dollars, but this trade volume grew 41.8 percent in 2010, to 55.4 billion US dollars.   This 2010 43
volume constitutes about 2.7 percent of total ASEAN trade.   As comparison, Sino-ASEAN 44
trade totaled about 362.9 billion US dollars in 2011, which constituted an increase by nearly 24 
percent compared to 2010.   Although these numbers show China’s trade dominance with 45
Southeast Asia, the foundation of the ASEAN-Indian Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) in 2010 
was a “milestone” achievement of India’s Look East Policy.   Furthermore, some scholars point 46
to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as another opportunity for Indian 
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integration into the Southeast-Asian trade network.   India’s increased trade with its eastern 47
neighbors, along with agreements like RCEP and the AIFTA, are essential for New Delhi’s 
attempt to balance China in the region.  As the Indian economy continues to grow, its Look East 
Policy will make cooperation with India even more appealing to the ASEAN nations. 
 The second and more recent tenant of LEP aims to improve security cooperation within 
Southeast Asia.  In fact, under current Prime Minister Modi, the Look East Policy has 
transitioned into an “Act East” policy, meaning that Indian actions in Southeast Asia have 
intensified in both economic and strategic scope.   While the original Look East Policy focused 48
primarily on the economic benefits of trade with ASEAN, this Act East policy stance responds to 
China’s growing security presence in the region.   New Delhi has endorsed an open, inclusive, 49
and “polycentric” security environment in Southeast Asia.   In addition, the unofficial Act East 50
policy includes increased defense spending and political engagements with ASEAN, such as the 
provision of patrol vessels and lines of credit to the region.   The increasingly active Indian 51
security cooperation with ASEAN nations, along with its economic integration, contrasts 
significantly with Indian policy in bilateral relations.  New Delhi will likely become a serious 
regional player, and in the process, it may be able to force some deference from China in the 
region.  This reversal in asymmetry—or, more likely, evening of asymmetry—results in part 
from the addition of actors in regional balancing.  Involvement with ASEAN nations will 
determine the future of India and China’s ability to balance, and potentially cooperate, in 
Southeast Asia. 
 Looking at China’s attitude towards the Look East Policy, a 2011 editorial in the official 
newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), PLA Daily, argued that New Delhi’s 
new security posture was an attempt to contain China.   While public discourse acknowledges 52
India’s growing regional influence, Beijing’s criticism of LEP often contains doubt that India 
will become an active regional leader.   The asymmetric power balance theory, therefore, still 53
exists at the regional level at least to the extent that China has yet to see India as a challenger to 
its own regional goals.  Nonetheless, security and economic competition renders the regional 
forum more promising for the equalization of Sino-Indian asymmetry than the bilateral forum. 
As China and India compete for political, naval, and economic influence in the Indian Ocean and 
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Southeast Asia, the former may eventually defer to the growing power of the latter—thus defying 
Womack’s theory. 
Forum 3:  Coexistence in a Multipolar World Order 
 The third and final forum of Sino-Indian relations is multilateralism.  As discussed above, 
domestic border disputes enforced Womack’s theory of asymmetric power politics, and changes 
in regional balancing present nascent transformations in how the states cooperate and compete 
with each other.  However, their participation in global policy forums like the BRICS and 
Bretton Woods institutions marks a new evolution of how China and India see each other.  54
These two emerging powers share an interest in multipolarity, and through both the expansion of 
Indian soft power and the global restraints on Chinese actions, New Delhi can defy the 
asymmetry defining their relationship today.  In a truly multipolar global system, India will no 
longer ask for recognized autonomy from China, and China will no longer be able to demand 
deference from India. 
Soft Power in BRICS Leadership 
 The BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—challenge the 
traditional division between developing and developed countries.  Two of these nations—India 
and China—distinguish themselves from the other three members of this abbreviation, for their 
population and economic growth have made them models for other developing countries.  As 
stated at the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012, the member countries present a 
platform “for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43 percent of the 
world’s population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-
dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.”   With the BRICS nations accounting 55
for about half of global economic growth today, cooperation between India and China will be 
essential to bring global attention to developing-country interests.   Strong leadership is required 56
for the BRICS to succeed, and it thus presents an opportunity for India to challenge Chinese 
economic domination with normative appeals to other developing countries. 
!  of !12 19
12
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/4
 Starting with Beijing’s approach to the BRICS, many Chinese scholars see the forum as a 
pathway to challenge traditional United States (US) hegemony.  Promising to never act as a 
hegemony, Chinese foreign policy has historically centered on the autonomy of all nations.   To 57
achieve autonomy and a multipolar system, Chinese scholars point to two key trends that must 
occur: first, a high level of global economic and financial integration; and second, the multi-
polarization of global politics.  The focus on economic integration explains China’s 58
collaboration with the other BRICS powers, whose simultaneous growth is essential to the 
challenge of the current US-dominated world order.  In contrast with China’s outwardly anti-
Western attitude, India’s approach to the BRICS—along with the Group of 20 (G-20)—has 
primarily addressed issues of economic and political global governance in general.   This 59
difference in approach to the BRICS marks a key opportunity for India to represent developing 
nations in a way that China has failed to do so.  Because the BRICS institutions represent a new 
world order with greater power in the hands of developing nations, New Delhi should focus on 
harnessing its soft power to advance its position among the BRICS. 
 Joseph Nye, who first established the theory of soft power in international relations, 
defines it as the “attraction that makes others want what you want.”  Soft power differs from 60
coercion, or what Nye calls “sticks,” and economic payment, or “carrots,” in that it rests on the 
ability to shape the preferences of others to align with one’s own.  Following to a certain extent 61
their overall visions of the BRICS, Indian and Chinese soft-power strategy will be a key 
determinant in their leadership of other developing nations. For instance, China’s soft power 
relies heavily on the appeal of its growing economy, which coincides with expanded Chinese 
foreign investment and humanitarian aid in developing countries.   On the other hand, being the 62
world’s largest democracy, Indian soft power derives from its image as a political model for 
developing nations.  Amit Kumar Gupta explains that India’s soft-power strategy has also 63
centered on capacity building among developing nations, whereas China primarily directs its 
resources towards infrastructure building.   If India continues to distinguish itself from China as 64
a democratic state that works to improve the political and economic capacity of its fellow 
developing countries, it will strengthen both its soft power and its leadership presence among the 
BRICS.   Womack’s theory, which focuses on the physical or economic size of states, fails to 65
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consider the role soft power plays in the relative global positions of states.  In some cases, 
relative soft power can be more important to a state’s ability to cooperate multilaterally than pure 
economic power, which is essential to India’s emerging leadership in the BRICS. 
Bretton Woods, Multipolarity, and Mutual Interests 
 In addition to soft power in BRICS leadership, the Bretton Woods institutions reveal the 
shared stakes China and India have in multipolarity. Because Chinese scholars see global 
economic integration as a necessary element for multipolarity, Beijing’s critiques of the Bretton 
Woods institutions provide insight into Chinese multilateral strategy.  For instance, Beijing has 
criticized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for their lack of 
transparency and slow pace of voting-rights reform, which favor the US and other Western 
powers based on their monetary contribution to the institution.   The Asian Infrastructure 66
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) are direct responses to 
the lack of reform of these Bretton Woods institutions, respectively.  Finally, exposing the 67
tension between Beijing’s vision for international trade and that of Washington, D.C., China has 
been involved in more anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) than expected at its entry.   Overall, Beijing’s approach to challenging 68
these Bretton Woods institutions exposes its attempts to balance the US and Europe. 
 Arndt Michael calls India’s approach to multipolarity and global institutions “Panchsheel 
Multilateralism,” which refers back to New Delhi’s emphasis on peaceful coexistence as outlined 
in its 1954 agreement with China.  Following the ideal of multipolar peaceful coexistence of all 69
states, Indian discourse in regards to the Bretton Woods institutions focuses on the 
democratization of the decision-making process.   In the IMF, India has criticized the slow pace 70
of voting rights reform similar to China, but it has also called for more general reform of the 
governance structure, to improve equality among states parties.  Next, New Delhi has demanded 71
that World Bank policy become friendlier to developing societies and economies.   Finally, 72
India has faced anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the WTO, but in contrast with 
China, complaints have rarely come from the US and Europe.  For India, the Bretton Woods 73
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institutions, thus, provide an opportunity to promote greater equality between the global North 
and South. 
 Although Sino-Indian competition still exists at the global level, the root of their interests 
in reform lies in one shared goal:  multipolarity.  Whether the world eventually follows India’s 
norm-based, Panchsheel Multilateralism or China’s economic-based, anti-Western 
multilateralism, both powers’ stakes in multipolarity create a policy forum for Sino-Indian 
cooperation.   Neither India nor China can reform institutions like those of Bretton Woods 74
without the other, so the intersection of multilateral interests defies Womack’s theory of 
asymmetric power balancing. If we base Sino-Indian relations solely on each state’s size or 
economic might, China would be Womack’s state A, or the large power. However, with the 
addition of variables like soft power and shared interests, India becomes more important to 
China’s long-term policy goals. As the difference in power between the two states diminishes on 
the multilateral stage, China can no longer expect complete deference from India. Womack’s 
asymmetry theory crumbles in this third forum, which explains why multilateralism is the ideal 
forum for Sino-Indian relations. Not only does the division between Indian and Chinese power 
diminish in global interactions, but the likelihood of conflict falls with multilateral cooperation 
compared to borders disputes. With widening mutual interests, the multilateral forum increases 
the costs of non-cooperation, therefore forcing both India and China to cooperate in ways 
unlikely in their bilateral and regional relations. 
Conclusion 
 Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric power relations predicts that when power 
asymmetries exist, a larger power will demand deference and a smaller power will demand 
autonomy.  Applying Womack’s theory to Sino-Indian relations at the bilateral, regional, and 75
multilateral level, this paper found that an asymmetric power balance primarily exists in the first 
of these three policy forums. Regional and multilateral competition mark a transition in the 
balance between India and China, in which the costs of non-cooperation expand with the number 
of external state actors and the overlapping of political interests. Consequently, the larger the cost 
of non-cooperation, the less asymmetric both players become. New Delhi and Beijing may still 
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see each other as competitors, but the future symmetry of Sino-Indian relations lies in their 
ability to peacefully balance and collaborate multilaterally. Cooperation has already occurred, 
and will likely continue, in this third forum of their complex relationship. As former Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized in various speeches, the world does have enough 
space for the growth ambitions of India and China, and this space begins with their participation 
in multilateral institutions.  76
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